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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND TREATMENT OF THE DATA 
The results of the Presidential election of 1948 pro-
duced one of the most stunning upsets in the history of 
elections in the United States . The odds against Harry s. 
Truman's winning re- election were considerable . As President , 
he was following one of the outstanding politicians in 
American history , Franklin Delano Roosevelt . 1 
In April of 1948, disaffected New Dealers and many 
city political bosses , feeling that Truman could not win 
the election , attempted to convince first General Dwight 
D. Eisenhower and then Supreme Court Justice William 0 . 
Douglas to run for President on the Democratic ticket . 2 
Up until the time of the Democratic National Convention in 
July , other influential members of the Democratic Party 
urged Truman to capitulate in favor of someone else . Poli -
tical experts of both parties who were supposedly "in the 
know" were saying that Truman could not possibly be re -
elected in the November election . During the Democratic 
1David Lawrence , "Poor Mr . Truman!" United States News 
and World Report , XXIV (April 9 , 1948) , 36o 
2Edward S . Corwin and Louis W. Koenig , The Presidency 
Today (New York : New York University Press , 1956) , p . 80 . 
Convention , some of the Southern delegates , angered by the 
civil rights plank established in the Democratic platform, 
walked out of the convention . 3 Truman's image was by and 
large that of a well - meaning but bungling President , no 
better qualified to discharge his duties as Chief of the 
2 
nation than the average man on the street . Furthermore , his 
simple , forthright and at times blunt manner alienated him 
from many of the "powers that be" in the Democratic Party . 4 
Thomas E. Dewey , his Republican opponent , was a young and 
efficient politician who had given Franklin Roosevelt a "run 
for his money" in the Presidential election of 1944. 5 Henry 
Wallace had been nominated as a Presidential candidate on the 
Progressive Party ticket . This party was expected to take 
most of its votes from the Democrats . 6 All of the major 
purveyors of predictions said that Truman did not have a 
chance . ? Yet in spite of the odds , Truman was re- elected to 
the Presidency in 1948 . 
3Ibid . 
4 11 The Democrats Have to be Progressive ," New Republic , 
CXIV (February 11 , 1946) , 88 . 
5
"Republicans Start a New Political Era , " Life , XXI 
(November 18 , 1948) , 31 . 
6 Rexford G. Tugwell , How T~ey Became 
York : Simon and Schuster ,-r964 , p . 437 . 
President (New 
7Ibid ., p . 436 . 
3 
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this study was twofold. First, an 
effort was made to analyze all of the pertinent factors that 
led to victory for Harry Truman and defeat for his major 
opponent, Thomas E. Dewey, in the Presidential election of 
1948. Secondly, there was an attempt made to discern why 
most of the media of prediction, including both amateur and 
professional forecasters, predicted that Thomas Dewey would 
win the Presidential election of 1948. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
History sometimes plays interesting tricks, and one 
occurred when Harry S. Truman became President of the United 
States. Here was a man who did not want to be President, 
for he himself said that he would have been happier serving 
his country as a United States Senator. 8 
Truman faced the most difficult of tasks, that of 
attempting to fill the shoes of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt was a man of great political powers (generally 
conceded by both friends and foes) and a magnetic per-
sonality. He had been at the nation's head for twelve 
8Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Vol. II of 
Memoirs. 2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 19, 
43. 
years, including in that time span most of World War II. 
Truman was destined to be compared unfavorably to the 
"Roosevelt legend."9 
Under these circumstances, Truman began his task; and 
4 
for various reasons, by the year 1948, Truman was in trouble 
politically speaking. In fact, no one gave him very much 
of a chance to win.10 
III. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study is important to historians in many ways. 
(1) Truman's victory in 1948 is considered one of the 
biggest political upsets of all time. The election of 1948 
is unique in American history. Never had so many been so 
wrong about the outcome of a Presidential election. 11 This 
uniqueness alone makes the study of the election significant. 
(2) After the 1948 election, a mass of material was devoted 
to explaining why Truman won, where Dewey blundered, and why 
9Peter R. Levin, Seven £y Chance: The Accidental Presi-
dents (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Company, 1948), pp. 
265, 288. 
10
"Mounting Troubles That Can Spell Defeat for Harry s. 
Truman," United States News and World Report, XXIV (March 
12, 1948), 34, 36; and "Fighter in a Fighting Year," Time, 
LIII (January 3, 1949), 10-11. 
11
"The Victorious Rebellion of Harry S. Truman," News-
week, XXXII (November 8, 1948), 3-4. ----
5 
the polls were mistaken. Most of these accounts were preju-
diced, and all lacked the partial perspective that the 
passage of time can give. One notable exception was the 
report on the pre-election polls of 1948, prepared by the 
Social Science Research Council, and even this report was 
more hastily prepared than it should have been. Since just 
after the election, there has been very little significant 
material written about the election. It is recognized that 
there have been many opinions, educated guesses, and 
sweeping statements made about the election. What is needed 
is an objective synthesizing and sifting of facts in order 
to discover exactly what happened in the Presidential 
election of 1948. (3) Truman's victory in 1948 is a study 
in masterful political campaigning, with an effective 
knowledge of human nature thrown in. Politicians and his-
torians can use this election as a casebook of human nature 
and political maneuverability. (4} Truman was a contro-
versial President. Whether he was a "great" President, a 
mediocre one, or somewhere in-between, only time will tell. 
This study should aid in the evaluation of Truman as a 
person and President. (5} Thomas Dewey, Truman's opponent, 
played a prominent role in American history for about ten 
years. Because of his prominence in the affairs of the 
nation, a study would be incomplete without an analysis of 
6 
his role in the Presidential election of 1948. (6) The 
terms ''public opinion" and "public opinion poll" have been 
used for some time and seem to be here to stay. These terms 
are intangible and abstract at best. However, by a study of 
the election of 1948, the historian, sociologist, psycholo-
gist, and average person can increase their knowledge of 
public opinion and improve the techniques of public opinion 
polls. Above all, the histQrian and all concerned should 
get an idea of the usefulness of public opinion polls and 
their future in the United States. 
IV. DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study did not include a description of Truman's 
childhood years, or any of the formative period before he 
became President of the United States (when he was Senator 
and Vice President) unless it pertained to an analysis of 
Truman as the political figure who was re-elected to the 
office of President in 1948. His decisions while President 
and a general description of his tenure in office were 
referred to only when the odds against Truman's victory in 
1948 were cited. His second term as President was not 
studied at all, nor was his retirement from the Presidency 
and subsequent life analyzed. A detailed biographical 
account of Thomas Dewey was not included in this study. 
7 
A brief resume of Dewey's political career prior to 1948 , 
and a more detailed account of his personality and tactics 
were included in order to get a better perspective of the 
election of 1948. Henry Wallace and Strom Thurmond , other 
prominent Presidential candidates in 1948, were dealt with 
only superficially , and then only in connection with the odds 
against Truman ' s re- election , and in a statistical account 
of the final outcome . There was not a detailed analysis 
(state by state) of the election results . Only general 
statements were made about particular areas of the United 
States and their relation to the Truman victory. A more 
detailed study of the statistics presented by public opinion 
polls was presented. Only the factors deemed important to 
the Truman victory and Dewey defeat were dealt with . Impor-
tant factors such as personality traits of Dewey and Truman, 
tactics of the two candidates , and the farm and labor vote 
were dealt with in detail . Public opinion polls were also 
studied in detail , as well as other less scientific forms 
of predictions , in order to determine why everyone predicted 
a Dewey victory. Through the study of the above- mentioned 
factors , an attempt was made to find out exactly why Harry 
s. Truman was the victor in 1948, after a near- unanimous 
prediction of his defeat was made . 
V. COLLECTION AND TREATMENT OF DATA 
Most of the information about the election of 1948 is 
contained in periodicals and newspapers such as Time, News-
week, U. s. News and World Report, and the New York Times. 
Books such as the Truman Memoirs, biographies of Truman and 
Dewey, and the Pre-election Polls of 1948 were studied. 
8 
This study consisted of five chapters. Chapter II 
studied the background of the election, including the death 
of Franklin Roosevelt and its influence on the public's 
attitude toward Truman, a detailed study of the Truman and 
Dewey personalities, and a description of some of the odds 
against Truman's being re-elected to the Presidency. Chap-
ter III was a detailed account and analysis of the campaign 
of 1948. Chapter IV dealt with public opinion polls and 
why they were wrong in their forecasts in 1948. These were 
dealt with from the standpoint of the average man, newspaper 
reporters, magazine editors, politicians, the pollsters 
themselves, and the Social Science Research Council. Chapter 
V gave the summary and conclusions gained from the study. 
VI. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Public: In this study "public" was used as an intan-
gible term describing a cross-section of the people of the 
United States. 
9 
Public Opinion: "Public opinion is the aggregate 
result of individual opinions--now uniform, now conflicting, 
of the men and women who make up society or any group of 
society." 12 
The American Institute of Public Opinion: This was 
the nation's leading public opinion poll in 1948, as 
organized by George Gallup. This institute attempted to 
analyze the election of 1948 and predict the outcome. 
Upset: A colloquial term meaning extreme deviation 
from the norm. 
12Edward L. Bernap, Crystallizing Public Ofinion, (New 
York: Liverwright Publishing Corporation, 1923 , p. 61. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF THE ELECTION 
The troubles Harry S. Tr uman was to encounter in the 
election of 1948 began on April 12 , 1945 , when it was 
announced that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had died 
of a cerebral hemorrhage in Warm Springs , Georgia . Although 
many people hated Franklin Roosevelt and critics were divided 
as to whether or not he was a great President , he had guided 
America through twelve years of war and peace . Because of 
his oratory , charm , and shrewd political ability , he had 
collected a large following by the time of his death . 1 
Not only did Franklin Roosevelt have a large group of 
followers , he had the political ability to unite both friends 
and enemies in compromises . An analysis of the Democratic 
Party at the time of Roosevelt's death reveals a coalition 
of New Deal liberals , Southern leaders who opposed many New 
Deal measures , labor leaders sensitive about their position , 
and Midwestern farmers concerned about their own prosperity . 2 
1R. Kent Fielding and Eugene E. Campbell , The United 
States : An Interpretive History (New York : Harper and Row, 
1964) ' p . 596 . 
2Gilman M. Ostrander , Profile History of the United 
States (New York: McGraw-Hill , 1964) , p . 424 . 
Roosevelt ' s major group of followers , the New 
Dealers , caused Truman considerable trouble in the cam-
paign of 1948 . This group , in collaboration with other 
liberals , was partially responsible for the "draft Eisen-
11 
hower11 movement , the "Dixiecrat revolt , " and the Progressive 
split in the pre- convention period and convention days of 
1948. Their attitude , whether intentional or not , was one 
of scorn for Truman when he assumed the Presidency. To 
their way of thinking , no one could take the place of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt , least of all a man as "average" as 
Harry S . Truman . They complained : 
Now, if you can get in to see Truman at all you 
have a feeling that he's just another government 
official in just another government office . There's 
no dazzle , no inspiration . Just apathy. You will 
notice that people around Washington still mean 
Roosevelt when they say 'the President;' they refer 
to the present White House occupant as ' Mr . Truman . •3 
Shortly after Truman became President , he reacted to 
the attitude of Roosevelt's loyal supporters by firing many 
of them. Although he supported many policies of the New 
Deal , bad feelings intensified and helped to explain the 
311 The Cooling of the South ' s Anti - Truman Revolt," 
United States News and World Report , XXIV (May 21, 1948) , 
24; see Ernest K. Lindley , "Democrats and Desperation , " 
Newsweek , XXXI (April 5 , 1948) , 19; and Jack Redding , 
Inside the Democratic Party (New York: Bobbs- Merrill Com-
pany , Inc ., 1958) , p . 191 . 
12 
disaffection of many of these liberals even after the Demo-
cratic Convention in 1948.4 
Yet Truman's foremost problem when he assumed the 
office of President of the United States had to do with his 
public image. In many ways he was the antithesis of Roose-
velt, who would have cast a large shadow over any successor. 
In this case, the shadow was even deeper and darker because 
of the contrast between Roosevelt and Truman. The public's 
attitude was expressed: "President Harry Truman is not 
Franklin Roosevelt, but he's the only President we have." 5 
Early in Truman's first term of office, an ironical 
change in public opinion became obvious. His popularity at 
one time, according to a Gallup poll, climbed to an eighty-
seven per cent approval rating. Primarily, three reasons 
accounted for this initial popular acceptance. First, the 
public saw Truman as "one of the people." In this sense, 
Truman brought the office of the Presidency closer to the 
people. Second, Truman took office in an unpretentious 
way. He promised to continue the policies of his prede-
cessor and not to "rock the boat." The most important 
4
"Mutineers and the Firm Hand," Newsweek, XXXII (July 
26, 1948), 18. 
5 
"The Democrats Have to be Progressive," New Republic, 
CXIV (February 11, 1946), 188. 
reason , however, was that both leading political parties- -
out of respect for Roosevelt and because they realized the 
handicaps his successor would have--paused to give the new 
man time to establish himself in office . Finally , the new 
President was able to get along with Congress better than 
Roosevelt had . For this reason , Truman's first few months 
in office gave the impression to most observers of being 
successful ones . 6 
The general acceptance of Truman did not last long. 
Truman ' s homespun personality did not necessarily qualify 
him for leading the nation • 
• • • the plain people still liked Harry Truman 
as a plain man , but he was not a President who 
inspired their high confidence and enthusiastic 
admiration • ••• A great many of the U. s . people 
felt sorry for him. 7 
The words honest and efficient used to describe 
Truman when he entered office were later changed to bun-
gling and inefficient . People began to believe that 
because of his humble attitude he was not qualified for 
the office of President . There were , however , more sub-
stantial reasons for belief that Truman was not qualified 
6 
Ernest K. Lindley , "Mr . Truman Under Fire , " News -
week , XXIII (February 25 , 1946) , 30 . --
7 
"After One Year , " Time , XLVI (April 15 , 1946) , 19. 
13 
to be President. He began his political career at the age 
of thirty-eight under the tutelage of Tom Pendergrast of 
14 
Kansas City. From his post as county judge, he was promoted 
by the party to the Senate where he acquired the reputation 
of being a "yes man" in Congress. On ninety per cent of 
all legislation he voted straight New Deal. The one 
exception to his uncreative career as Senator was his 
efficiency in handling what came to be known as the Truman 
Committee. 8 Rather by accident, he was elected to the Vice 
Presidency. He was a compromise candidate who, because 
he was a Southerner and because of his voting record in the 
Senate (where he had managed to stay in the background and 
follow), was considered harmless. As President, a totally 
new, active leadership was expected. He could not make the 
switch effectively. At this time " •• he (Truman) followed 
events; he did not lead them." 9 
Unqualified for the office himself, Truman appointed 
old friends to high places in the government when he became 
8A Senate committee of which Truman was chairman 
which performed valuable service during World War II by 
investigating corruption in government war contracts. 
9Harold J. Laski, "The American Political Scene," 
Nation, CLXIII (November 16, 1946), 550; Peter R. Levin, 
Seven £y Chance: The Accidental Presidents (New York: 
Farrar, Strauss and Company, 1948), pp. 280-286; and Robert 
s. Allen and William W. Shannon, The Truman Merry-go-round 
(New York: The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1950), pp. 18-19. 
15 
President. Many of these men were as unqualified for their 
respective offices as Truman was fo r his . The term "crony" 
with all its derisive connotation became a popular way to 
describe the Tr uman appointees . Truman himself complained 
of the incompetency of many of his appointees , but because 
of loyalty to them he would not f i re them • 
• • • a man any less stubbornly loyal to his 
cronies might have decided that some friends were 
more trouble than they were worth . This was one 
decisi8n that Harry Truman seemed unwilling to 
face . l 
The result was confusion in the Government . After a 
short time in office , Truman tried to enact changes in the 
Chief Executive office . He wanted to establish a personal 
rapport with Congress . His plan included a "hands off" 
policy to permit the nation ' s legislators more freedom . 
The idea was a good one in theory , but was a failure in 
application . What the nation wanted was a man who could 
implement his ideas . What they wer e getting was a genial , 
har dworking man who had yet to become a leader others would 
follow . ll 
1011A Little Mor e Hectic , " Time , XLIV (Febr uary 18 , 
1946) ' 17. 
ll Avery Craven and Walter Johnson , The United States: 
Experiment in Democracy (second edition ; New York: Ginn 
and Company , 1962), p . 590 . 
Harold Laski , leader of the British Labor Party at 
this time , and a visitor to the United States in 1946 , 
described the nation under Truman ' s leadership : 
To the foreign observer of the American scene , 
the outstanding characteristic of the landscape is 
the absence of effective leadership . There is 
nowhere any clear picture of direction . There is a 
confused babble of noises from which emer ges no 
decisive note. The White House may have the best 
of intentions , but Americans watch it rather to see 
the mistakes it will make than to hope for the 
guidance it might offer . 12 
Laski also criticized the President ' s relaxed atti -
16 
tude toward his job , his penchant for selecting friends for 
office and his obvious inexperience. Laski's summary was a 
cutting one: 11 President Tr uman is a weak President because 
he has not the special kind of resolution which makes a 
strong President ." 13 
The overall picture one gets of Truman at this time 
is that of a good- natured , muddling President incapable of 
doing his job. This image car ried over to the campaign of 
1948; however , the picture was distorted . Truman probably 
saw himself more accurately than the pollsters did when , 
on the slip of his popularity rating to forty - eight per 
cent in April of 1947 , he said : "I never should have been 
12L k . as 1 , 
13Ibid . 
QQ. cit., 548 . 
17 
eighty-seven and I never should have been thirty-two. But 
forty-eight isn't far off." 14 Truman was not yet an expe-
rienced hand at leading the nation, but he was far from the 
incompetent bungler he was pictured as in 1947. 
Several factors contributed to the distortion of the 
Truman picture. Truman's inexperience, coupled with his own 
attitude, emphasized his inadequacies. In a speech to the 
people of Independence, Missouri, shortly after his acci-
dental rise to the Presidency, he said: "I shall attempt 
••• to meet your expectations, but don't expect too much 
Of ,,15 me. 
Truman's image always suffered when contrasted with 
Franklin Roosevelt who made Truman, in 1946, look like a 
much poorer President than he was. Truman keenly felt his 
Presidential responsibility and was sensitive to critical 
comparisons between himself and his predecessor. The 
result was a tension-ridden government that was expending 
itself in petty quarreling, instead of focusing on the 
business of running a nation.16 
1411Republican Honeymoon is Over," Fortune, XXXV 
(April, 1947), 79. 
1511 President After 52 Weeks, A Surer Man," Newsweek, 
XXVII (April 15, 1946), 26. 
16Frank Friedel, America in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965T, pp. 484, 491-493. 
18 
The office of Chief Executive itself was undergoing 
subtle changes at the time Truman was President. The 
experienced politicians, as well as the average person, had 
held the office of the Presidency in awe during Roosevelt's 
years in office. Truman, however, worked toward bringing 
the office of President of the United States down to the 
people's level. Truman succeeded. In fact, he did the job 
to his own detriment. Much of Roosevelt's power had been 
dependent on maintaining a respectable distance between 
himself and the people. Legislators, government officials, 
and the common man respected Roosevelt and listened when he 
spoke. Truman lost this respect when he decreased the aes-
thetic distance between the office of President and the 
level of the common man.17 
Despite these distortions in the image Truman pro-
jected, the Democratic Party entered the Congressional 
election of 1946 disorganized and with no recognized 
leader. The liberal factor of the party looked back to the 
leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and mourned that there 
was now no guiding influence in the White House. Truman 
had fired several of their number and seemed conservative 
in comparison with their late, beloved leader. 18 
17Ibid. 
18 
Allen and Shannon, £2• cit., p. 25. 
The Republicans took advantage of the Democratic 
split, between the pro- Trumans and pro- Roosevelts, and 
conducted an effective campaign. Their slogan , coined by 
a New England businessman , was "Had Enough? Vote Repub-
lican!" The people had "had enough . " They were ready for 
a change . The result was an overwhelming victory for the 
Republicans. 19 
19 
Ordinarily , the party in power experiences some slump 
in midterm elections , but rarely has a political party been 
so overwhelmingly repudiated at the polls as were the Demo -
crats in 1946. They had been in power for fourteen years. 
The average United States' citizen was war weary and took 
this opportunity to vote against the political party that 
had been in power during the war years . Truman and the 
Democratic Party were blamed for such things as labor 
strikes , inflation , and poor diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Russia.20 Added to the public dis -
content was the fact that the Democrats were fighting among 
themselves and did not conduct an effective campaign in 
1946 . 
19Hugh A. Bone , American Politics and the Party System 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company , Inc. , 1955) , p. 260; 
and Leland Baldwin , The Stream of American History (New York: 
American Book Co ., 1957) , pp . 736- 737. 
2
°Cabell Phillips , The Truman Presidency (New York: 
The Macmillan Company , 1966T; p . 160 . 
20 
The Republican victory in 1946 suggested that the 
Republicans were about to become the party in power. The 
Republican-dominated Congress could establish national 
policy during the next two years and have only token oppo-
sition. Barring unforseen developments, a Republican would 
be elected President of the United States.21 Few people, 
Democrats or Republicans, doubted that the party switch was 
probable. 
The result of the Congressional elections of 1946 was 
not, however, the disaster for the Democratic Party that many 
thought it was. Because he had felt the responsibility for 
continuing to implement Roosevelt's New Deal programs (which 
were not his own) , almost everything Truman attempted to do 
was a dim carbon copy of his predecessor. The party defeat 
in 1946 was, to him, a repudiation of New Deal policies. 
After the defeat, he felt that he was relieved of the 
responsibility of continuing FDR's version of the New Deal. 
Truman was forced to institute his own program. For the 
first time since entering office, Truman was able to take 
the offensive.22 And, as he became more aggressive about 
2111 Republicans Start a New Political Era," Life, XXI 
(November 15, 1946), 31. 
22 Allen and Shannon, Q£. cit., p. 30. 
leading , the Truman victory of 1948 began to materialize . 
In late 1947 he initiated final tactics that were to carry 
him to victor y . 
21 
Clark Clifford , closest of Truman's advi sors , out-
lined in November , 1947 , what the new Truman emphasis should 
be . Clifford , with unusual political acumen , predicted that 
Thomas Dewey would be Truman ' s opponent in the 1948 Presi-
dential election , and that Henry Wallace would run on a 
third party ticket . Clifford erroneously calculated the 
strength of the Dixiecrat revolt , but was accurate in his 
other predictions . He advised Truman to give top priority 
in his political strategy to the farmers , to labor groups , 
to Negroes , and to Jews . Truman should court the common 
people because of his identity with them. 23 
Truman took the experts ' advice under strong consid-
eration , but he initiated some caution of his own. Truman's 
image began to change. Examples are abundant . He vetoed the 
Taft- Hartley bill . 24 He advocated and implemented a strong 
stand on civil rights by the Democratic Party . He spoke 
23Phillips , 2£• cit., pp . 197- 199 . 
24 The Taft-Hartley bill was introduced by Congress 
for two primary reasons . First , it was introduced to 
redress the balance of bargaining between labor and manage-
ment by defining unfair labor practices for union as well as 
employees . Secondly , it was to protect the individual 
workers from arbitrary control of labor leaders . 
in favor of price controls . He pacified the Jews by a 
quick recognition of the new nation of Israel . It is sig-
nificant that all of these actions , except the Palestinian 
22 
question , became major issues in 1948. His strong stand on 
civil rights precipitated the Dixiecrat revolt , but gained 
votes from Negroes and Independents . His stand on price 
controls influenced many farmers , who would not otherwise 
have done so , to cast their votes for Truman . 25 
The Truman-Clifford strategy went almost undetected 
by the professional pollsters and the general public , who 
still evaluated Truman an ineffective President , the Demo -
cratic Party a decadent structure , and the chances of a 
Democrat's being elected to the Presidency in 1948 as 
practically nil . 26 
True to Clark Clifford ' s prediction , however , the 
Republicans in 1948 nominated Thomas Dewey as their Presi-
dential candidate . Since the early 1940's , Dewey's personality 
traits had been emphasized by the press . 27 Dewey had a cold 
personality , magnified by bad relations with newsmen . He 
York : 
25Allen and Shannon , loc . cit. 
26Rexford Tugwell , How T~ey Became President (New 
Simon and Schuster , 1964 , pp . 436-437 . 
27Richard H. Revere , "Dewey: the Man in the Blue 
Serge Suit , " Harpers Magazine , CLXXXVIII (May , 1944) , 482. 
23 
was impatient with reporters and attempted to use them 
rather than to woo them. As a result of his impoliteness, 
newspapermen castigated him in print at every opportunity. 
They called him "conceited," "superficial," "unnaturally 
ambitious." They concluded that he was not qualified to 
become President of the United States. 28 
In the Presidential campaign of 1944 (in which Dewey 
ran against Franklin Roosevelt), the personality traits of 
Dewey had been similarly attacked. At that time, one news-
man said, ". • .not since Charles Evans Hughes has a 
nominee crossed America and left such a chill behind him."29 
Another, just as caustically, said, " ••• we just don't like 
Dewey. This is about our worst charge. He is a cold 
f . h n30 l.S • 
Several critics complained of Dewey's cliches like 
"We shall have our freedom so long as we are are free.n31 
28
oswald Villiard, "Our Lack of Leadership," Christian 
Century, LIX (September 25, 1942), 1083-4; see "Thomas E. 
Dewey: The Man and His Record," New Republic, CXI (Sep-
tember 25, 1944), 387, 389; I. F. Stone, "Thomas E. Dewey: 
Close-up of a Candidate, .. Nation, CLVIII (May 20, 1944), 
586; and Rovere, QQ. cit., 484. 
2911 Dewey Climaxes His Tour in Los Angeles," Life, 
XVII (October 2, 1944), 35. 
30
"We Take Our Stand,n New Republic, CXI (October 
23, 1944)' 530. 
31 Rovere, 2£• cit., 482. 
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Stanley Walker, author of an obviously partisan book on the 
life of Dewey, did not attempt to refute the evaluations of 
Dewey's personality, but rather emphasized Dewey's effi-
ciency as an off-setting quality for his poor personality.32 
Even as early as 1943, the Dewey forces had begun 
to revamp their leader's public image. They needed to 
shift the attention from Dewey's cold personality. Dewey 
himself relaxed and attempted to establish some rapport 
with the press. His best selling point was his record as 
District Attorney of New York. This was emphasized. He 
was billed as one of the most successful prosecuters in 
New York history.33 He was projected as a successful gov-
ernor. 
In three years as Governor (1943-45) he had 
built up New York's cash surplus to a staggering 
$500 million. In the election of 1946, Tom Dew~4 
was re-elected by a whopping margin of 650,000. 
He was called "· •• a quick, inquisitive, and force-




32Ernest K. Lindley, "Dewey, F. D. R., and the 
Word," Newsweek, XXIV (July 10, 1944), 40. 
33
rrving Stone, They Also Ran (New York: Pyramid 
1943)' pp. 417-418. 
34Phillips, loc. cit. 
35 
Raymond Moley, "Dewey of New York," Newsweek, XXI 
29 ' 1943) ' 80 • 
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His youth , and comparatively good showing against 
Roosevelt in 1944 were alluded to as worthy . His supporters 
emphasized that: 
••• with his moderate reforms and his conser-
vative financial policy, Thomas E. Dewey has managed 
to impress the country ' s voters as a liberal , but 
not too liberal , governor , a sound but not too con-
servative Republican . 36 
By late 1947 , Truman was looking worse , being 
compared with both Dewey and Roosevelt . Roosevelt was 
brilliant . Dewey was efficient . Truman was average . 
36 
"Election: Why Dewey Deserves the \tote , " Life , 
XVII (October 6 , 1944) , 34 ; see 11 GOP Jockeyings , ItTSJ'ust 
Dewey vs. Wilkie , " Newsweek , XXIII (January 24 , 1944) , 39 ; 
R. L. Buell , "Should Libe r als Vote For Dewey?" Life , XVII 
(October 30 , 1944) , 60; Irving Stone , 2£• cit.,-p:-451; 
and "Thomas Dewey Sticks to His Albany Knitting , " Life , 
XVI (March 20 , 1944) , 95 . --
CHAPER III 
THE CAMPAIGN 
The Presidential campaign of 1948 started on December 
29 , 1947 in Chicago . Henry Wallace , in an emotional , nation-
wide broadcast , announced that he would be the Progressive 
Party's nominee for President of the United States . He 
stated in his announcement address that the two major poli-
tical parties were tired and old--the Republican Party being 
11 hopeless11 and the Democrats being saddled with a leader who 
was driving the United States nearer to war with Russia . 1 
The Wallace candidacy posed a serious threat to 
Truman's re - election . Wallace appealed to disillusioned 
New Dealers and other liberals; and , in the early weeks 
of 1948, many of this group announced that they were sup-
porting the Progressive Party. Many columnists and political 
experts predicted that Wallace would cost Truman the electoral 
votes of important states such as New York , Illinois , and 
California. 
1Cabell Phillips , The Truman Presidency (New York: 
The Macmillan Company , 1966) , p . 201 ; and Samuel Eliot 
Morrison , The Oxford History of the American People (New 
York: Oxford University Press , 1965) , p . 1049. 
27 
However, as the campaign progressed, the influence of 
the Wallace revolt was found to be less than originally sup-
posed. Although Henry Wallace was not a Communist, he would 
not disavow Communist support. However, it was soon dis-
covered that many of the people holding influential positions 
in the Progressive Party were Communists. This Communist 
infiltration cost Wallace many liberal votes. As a result, 
when the final vote was counted, only a little over a million 
people had voted for Wallace. 2 
The main problem that the Progressive Party posed to 
the Democrats throughout the campaign was that the Democrats 
did not know whether Wallace would take enough votes away 
from Truman to give the victory to Dewey. This caused Truman 
to be undecided as to whether he should concentrate verbal 
ammunition on Wallace or leave him alone. He finally decided 
on the latter, which proved to be successful. 3 
In addition to the Wallace defection, the Democrats 
also had to deal with what came to be known as the Dixiecrat 
2Charles A. Madison, Leaders and Liberals in 20th Cen-
~ America (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing ~---
1961), pp. 445-446; Rexford G. Tugwell, How Th)y Became 
President (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964 , p. 436; 
"Mounting Troubles That can Spell Defeat for Trumant" United 
States News and World Report, XXXII (March 12, 1948), 34; and 
Eric Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny (second edition; New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 322-325. 
3Phillips, 2£. cit., p. 205. 
28 
revolt. Truman had consistently provoked Southern Democrats 
since 1945 with his strong stand in favor of civil rights. 
However, until 1948, Truman had only talked about what should 
be done about discrimination against the Negro. In February, 
Truman issued a civil rights message asking for legislation 
to end " ••• segregation and discrimination in the use of 
transportation facilities by both public officers and the 
4 
employees of private companies throughout the country." 
Southern reaction to Truman's message was quick and 
decisive. A six-man delegation headed by Strom Thurmond, 
later to be nominated for President on the States Rights 
ticket, went to Washington to confer with Democratic leaders 
about the position of the party on the Negro. Thurmond 
asked Howard McGrath if he would use his position as National 
Chairman of the Democratic Party to influence the President 
to soften his stand on the civil rights issue. McGrath 
declined to do so and the Southern delegation went home com-
pletely defeated. 5 
4 
Harry s. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Vol. II of 
Memoirs. 2 vols.; Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), p. 181; 
Thomas Bonner, Our Recent Past (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall, 1965), p. 347; and V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in 
State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 330. 
5Phillips, Q£. cit., p. 207; Jack Redding, Inside the 
Democratic Party (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 
1958), p. 192; and "The Victorious Rebellion of Harry s. 
Truman," Newsweek, XXXII (Nevember 8, 1948), 3. 
29 
Frustrated because of their inability to achieve the 
desired results , Southern leaders planned a meeting of dele-
gates in Jackson on May 10 , 1948, to discuss their strategy 
for the coming campaign . Delegates from only seven Southern 
states attended , and results of the meeting were far from 
satisfactory to many ardent segregationalist leaders . How-
ever , this meeting was a step toward the organization that 
was to take away thirty- eight electoral votes from the Demo-
crats on election day . 6 
Nation-wide reaction to the Truman stand on civil 
rights was generally unfavorable. David Lawrence thought: 
Strong conservative support had already been given 
to Mr . Truman from the Democratic South and there was 
available to him a substantial conservative strength 
of a liberal kind in the North among Independent 
voters •••• Mr. Truman , on the other hand , forfeited 
the respect of the South by a message on 'civil 
rights' •••• Politically , it was a mistake for Mr . 
Truman to try to curry favor with a 'left wing' 
minority on this issue . For~ by doing so , Mr. 
Truman lost the South • •• • t 
At the Democratic Convention , held early in July, 
the problem came up again . Any chance for compromise or mol-
lification was ended when liberals--headed by Hubert Humphrey , 
mayor of Minneapolis - -held out for the adoption of a strong 
6Phillips , 2£· cit., p. 208. 
7David Lawrence , "Poor Mr. Truman!" United States News 
and World Report , XXIV (April 9 , 1948) , 37 . 
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civil rights plank in the Democratic platform. The liberals 
won a trial vote on the issue and a portion of the Southern 
delegation walked out.8 
Democratic platforms since Roosevelt first ran for 
President in 1932 had stated that the Democratic Party 
believed in equal rights for Negro and white. The difference 
between 1932 and 1948 was that Truman actually intended to 
enforce the civil rights plank in the Democratic platform. 
After the Southern delegates had walked out of the convention, 
one reporter said to Strom Thurmond: "President Truman is 
only following the platform that Roosevelt advocated." 
"I agree," Thurmond replied, "but Truman really means it."9 
The most damaging blow to Truman's re-election plans 
came from the political bosses and leading liberals in his 
own party. After a Gallup poll in May which stated that the 
Truman popularity had dropped to thirty-six per cent, many of 
the leaders in the Democratic Party reasoned that with Truman 
as their nominee it would be impossible for the Democratic 
Party to win the Presidential election in 1948. They franti-
cally began to search for another man to lead the party. The 
most obvious choice was General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
8Redding, loc. cit.; and Phillips, 2£· cit., p. 219. 
9 Truman, QQ. cit., p. 183. 
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Ame r ica ' s most idolized war hero . Jake Arvey , Jewish poli-
tical boss of Chicago , instigating the Ei senhower move , said , 
11 Come election time • • • I wi ll vote fo r ••• a man who can be 
el ected . I hope Gener al Eisenhower becomes available . ulO 
The "draft Eisenhower" movement gr ew str onger despite 
the fact that people did not know what Eisenhower stood for . 
They only knew that they wanted a popular figure to replace 
Tr uman . Although Eisenhower had never taken an active part 
in politics , and ther efor e knew little about such problems 
as civil rights , labor , and other issues , many party leaders 
were willing to tur n the reins of the party over to this 
political novice because of his popularity . 
A sizable cross section of the Democratic Party indi-
cated that they also would be in favor of a ticket led by 
Eisenhower . Among Ike ' s supporters were Elliott and James 
Roosevelt , sons of the former President; Mayor Frank Hague 
of Jersey City ; Leon Henderson , head of Americans for Demo-
cratic Action; Hugh Mitchell , Democr atic leader in the state 
of Washington; Senator Claude Pepper of Florida ; Senator 
Richard Russell of Georgia ; Governor A. B. (Happy) Chandler of 
Kentucky ; Paul Douglas , Illinois candidate for Senator ; John 
Bailey , State Chairman of Connecticutt ; Gover nor Jim Nance 
1011 The Black and White Beans , " Time , LI (May 3 , 1948) , 
21; and "Panic , " Time , LI (April 5 , 1948) , 22. 
McCord of Tennessee; Mayor Edward Kelly of Chicago ; Mayor 
William O' Dwyer of New York; Senators Lester Hill and John 
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Sparkman of Alabama; Hubert Humphrey , mayor of Minneapolis; 
Walter Reuther of the CIO; Chester Bowles and Wilson Wyatt , 
who were also leaders in Americans for Democratic Action . 11 
The consensus of political opinion was that no one 
except for Eisenhower would have a chance to retain the Presi-
dency for the Democrats. Many felt that for the sake of 
Senatorial , Congressional , and Gubernatorial candidates who 
would lose votes if Truman ran , the President should step 
down and let General Eisenhower or some strong candidate 
take over. One correspondent ' s remarks represented party 
feeling : 
President Truman cannot avoid being aware of the 
open opposition to his renomination . It is doubtful , 
however, whether he realizes that almost nobody in his 
party really wants him to run again •••• This is not 
because they think he is a weak candidate . He lacks 
popular appeal , skill as a political manager , and 
force as a leader . 12 
During the "draft Eisenhower" movement , General Eisen-
hower maintained silence . Claude Pepper , Senator from 
1111 Democrats and Desperation , " Newsweek , XXXII (April 
5 , 1948) , 19; Redding , QQ . cit. , p . 162; Phillips , 2£• cit. , 
pp. 210- 211; and Herbert Agar , The Price of Power (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press , 1957), p . 81 . 
12Ernest K. Lindley "Advice to the Democrats , " News-
week , XXXII (July 12, 1948} , 27 . 
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Florida , wired the general two days before the Democratic 
Convention and stated that the Democrats planned to nominate 
Eisenhower with or without his approval . Eisenhower stated: 
11 I would refuse to accept the nomination under any conditions , 
terms , or premises . 1113 This squelched the "draft Eisenhower" 
movement and assured Truman of the nomination in 1948. 
Despite the dismal outlook in the preconvention days 
of the campaign of 1948 and some opposition , Truman was 
convinced that the people were still for him. He set out to 
prove where the public's sympathies lay by taking a "non-
political" tour across the nation in April of 1948 . Truman's 
stated purpose for the trip was to receive an honorary degree 
from the University of California at Berkeley . The actual 
purpose of the jaunt was to give Truman a chance to speak 
extemporaneously to the people of America and to test the 
peoples' reaction to the Truman personality . Most of his 
speeches were given from the rear platform of a train in 
such places as Pocatello, Idaho; Eugene , Oregon; Gary , Indi-
ana; and Laramie , Wyoming . The highlight of the tour came 
when Truman reached Los Angeles . Crowds estimated at more 
than a million people jammed the parade route to catch a 
glimpse of the President. Although virtually ignored by 
13Phillips , QQ. cit ., p . 211 . 
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most political observers, the people's reaction helped con-
vince Truman that he should run for re-election, and set a 
precedent for the famous "Give 'em Hell" campaigning by 
Truman in the latter part of the 1948 campaign. Senator 
Robert Taft's complaint about Truman's "whistle stop" cam-
paign actually helped Truman. Not only was a new political 
term coined, but Taft incited the ire of cities across the 
United States who were not overjoyed at having their cities 
called "whistle stops.u14 
Shortly after Truman returned from his "non-political" 
tour, the national political conventions began. The Repub-
licans held their convention first at Philadelphia in June. 
The three leading candidates were Robert A. Taft, Harold 
Stassen, and Thomas E. Dewey. Taft had the disadvantage of 
being a leader in Senate at a time when the Republicans 
were trying to disassociate themselves from the record of 
the Eightieth Congress. Stassen had been a sensation in 
the early Presidential primaries but had incurred the wrath 
of the Republican "Old Guard" by his unconventional tactics--
such as entering the Ohio primary. Ohio was the horne state 
of Senator Taft. The only remaining alternative was Thomas 
E. Dewey. Dewey was not very well liked, but his political 
14Ibid., pp. 211, 213-216. 
record was good. Earl Warren, popular governor of Cali-
fornia, was nominated as Dewey's running mate.15 
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The Democrats moved into Philadelphia in July to hold 
their convention. One commentator described them as exci-
table, idealistic, and reckless when in convention assembly. 
He said that they would rather fight among themselves than 
with the enemy. The 1948 convention was a unique one. The 
incumbent candidate for President was re-nominated, but with 
extreme reluctance. The atmosphere of the whole meeting was 
that of gloomy resignation. The delegates were resigned to 
the unpleasant task of re-nominating a Presidential candi-
date who they felt could not possibly win. Despite the 
attempts of the Southerners, the liberals, the Wallacites, 
and a gathering generally apathetic toward Truman, he won 
the re-nomination on Wednesday, July 14. Truman got 948 
votes, while Richard Russell received the entire Southern 
vote of 263. Alben Barkley was nominated as the Democratic 
Vice Presidential candidate. 16 
15Hugh Bone, American Politics and the Pafty System 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955 , p. 261; 
and Harvey Wish, Contemporar~ . America: The National Scene 
Since 1900 (fourth edition; ew York: Harper and Row, 
1966), pp. 662-663. 
16D. W. Brogan, Politics in America (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1954), p. 214; Ernest K. Lindley, "Democratic 
Low Ebb,'' Newsweek, XXXII (July 9, 1948), 21; and Phillips, 
QQ. cit., p. 221. 
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The high point of the Democratic Convention came on 
the last day . Knowing that the convention was tired and 
their spirits low, at 2 :00 in the morning Truman made what 
has come to be one of the most famous acceptance speeches in 
political history: 
Senator Barkley and I will win this election and 
make the Republicans like it , dont you forget 
that •••• Never in the world were the farmers ••• 
as prosperous (as now) ••• and if they don't do 
their duty by the Democratic Party they're the most 
ungrateful people in the world •••• And I'll say 
to labor just what I ' ve said to the farmer . 17 
He criticized the Eightieth Congress and the Republican 
platform. " · •• They promised to do in that platform a 
lot of things I ' ve been asking them to do and that they've 
refused to do when they had the power ." The next point of 
the speech was the surprising one-- i.e • 
• • • On the twenty- sixth day of July , which out 
in Missouri they call ' Turnip Day,' I'm going to call 
Congress back •.•• What that worst 80th Congress 
does in its special session will be the test . 19 
The recalling into session of the Eightieth Congress 
proved to be a master stroke of political maneuvering. The 
response of the tired delegates at the Democratic Convention 
was tremendous. The Democratic Party, almost politically 
dead , lived and breathed again . (Truman later admitted that 
17111 . J.ne 
18 
Ibid . 
Squall ," Time , LIII (July 26 , 1948) , 14. 
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he knew that Congress could not pass many bills in a fifteen-
day special session. He confessed that his idea of a special 
session was a strictly political and partisan move calculated 
to embarrass the Republicans). Editorials across the nation 
roundly denounced the recall, but it accomplished its pur-
pose. 11 Turnip Day" focused the eyes of the nation on the 
Republican "do nothing 11 Congress and set the stage for 
Truman's whole campaign.l9 
Even more important in Truman's campaign strategy than 
his blasts at the Eightieth Congress was the personality of 
Harry Truman. As far back as 1947 a wise political observer 
realized that: 
The ••• biggest Republican problem is named Harry 
Truman. This is a brand-new problem, so new that 
some Republicans have not even heard of it as a prob-
lem. 
Most Americans, in the days following the Repub-
lican triumph last fall would have laughed at the 
thought that Mr. Truman could win the Presidency in 
1948. Those who do not follow politics closely are 
probably of this mind now. But the keenest G. 0. P. 
leaders believe today, that, given a not impossible 
set of circumstances, Harry Truman may be a hard man 
to beat; and though they say this privately, they say 
it in deepest sincerity.20 
19 
Phillips, QQ. cit., pp. 222-223; and Dexter Perkins 
and Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The American Democracy: Its 
Rise to Power (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964T: pp. 
597-598. 
2011Republicans Honeymoon is Over," Fortune, XX.XV 
(April, 1947), 77. 
Harry Truman sought to overcome a set of supposedly 
impossible obstacles, with a campaign fitted around his 
personality. Because he was facing defeat and had only a 
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decadent Democratic organization, which had by and large 
already given up, Truman had no choice but to wage a fierce 
campaign. He stayed on the offensive at all times, carrying 
the fight to the Republicans in every way possible, capi-
talizing on mistakes and making political capital in any 
way possible. 21 
Many ridiculed Truman's conducting the "whistle stop" 
type of campaign. Truman traveled 22,000 miles to tell the 
country what he believed in and why the people should not 
vote Republican. The trips were not dignified or organized, 
but proved very effective. "He personally carried his story 
to the people. 1122 
Truman's campaign began officially in Detroit on Labor 
Day. In the city of labor, Truman attacked the Republicans' 
stand on labor, particularly their veto of the Taft-Hartley 
21
"Long Shot That Won't Give Up," Newsweek, XXXII 
(October 11, 1948), 26; and John A. Garraty, The American 
Nation: A History of the United States (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1966), pp. 806-807. 
22w. McMillen, "Miracle of 1948, 11 Vital Speeches XV 
(January 1, 1949), 182. 
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Act. Truman gave the impression that if Dewey were elected 
President the labor cause would suffer a severe blow.23 
Traveling into Iowa, farming country, Truman described 
the Republicans as primarily concerned with big business 
and accused the Republicans of betraying the American 
farmer. He cited the fact that the farmers had no place 
to store their grain and thus were forced to sell their 
grain below the support price because they had no place to 
store it. For this, they could thank the same Republican 
Congress. 24 
So it went across the country. At the end of the 
first ten-day jaunt across the country, Mr. Truman's advisors 
believed that they had made some progress. They also thought 
Truman had set a background for strategy that would pay off 
later. They felt that Truman had connected Dewey suffi-
ciently with the troubles of the Eightieth Congress. They 
also felt that sooner or later Dewey would have to reply to 
the Truman charges and that this would be to the advantage 
of the Democrats.25 
And so the Truman cavalcade went rocketing up and 
down the land, laying down a barrage of political 
23Phillips, QQ. cit., p. 232. 
24Ibid., p. 236. 
25News item in the New York Times, October 3, 1948. 
hyperbole , accusation and ridicule . Much of it was 
nonsense and some of it was shameful , but there was 
a seed of truth in most of what he said and an e~g­
ment of low- keyed heroics in the way he said it. 
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Truman even intensified his attacks on Dewey and the 
Republicans . In Wilmington , Delaware , on October 6 , Truman 
exclaimed: 
Herbert Hoover once ran on this slogan: ' Two cars 
in every garage .' Apparently the Republican candidate 
this year is running on the slogan : ' Two families in 
every garage . • 27 
In Philadelphia on the same day , he attacked Dewey ' s unity 
theme : "We believe in the unity of free men . We believe in 
the unity of great causes . We don ' t believe in the unity of 
slaves or the unity of sheep being led to slaughter . "28 At 
Rochester on October 8 , Truman attacked the Republican Party : 
"The leopard has not changed his spots--he has merely hired 
some public relations experts ." 29 In St . Paul Truman 
attacked the '' me too " attitude of the Republicans: " · •• The 
American people should consider the risk of entrusting their 
destiny to recent converts who come along and say , ' Me too , 
26Phillips , Q£ . cit ., p . 241 . 
27«By Harry S . Truman : Campaign Barbs That Won The 




but I can do better.' "30 At Johnston , Pennsylvania , Truman 
taunted the Republicans : "GOP these days means just one 
thing: ' Grand Old Platitude .' 11 31 
Truman continued his attack on the campaign tactics 
of the Republicans in Pittsburg on October 23 : "This soft 
talk and double talk ••• proceeds upon the assumption that 
you can fool the people--or enough of them--all the time . n32 
Finally , in Brooklyn on October 29 , an optimistic Truman 
said: "I have good news for you . We have the Republicans 
on the run • ••• We are going to win . u33 
The zenith in Truman ' s campaign speeches was reached 
in his last one which was broadcast to the nation from St . 
Louis , Missouri on October 29 . In it , he emphasized his own 
achievements . He referred to his bringing the war to a 
successful conclusion , and his support of the founding of 
the United Nations . He then stressed that the major asset 
of the Democratic Party was that it was a peoples ' party . 
He pointed to New Deal reforms which were enacted for the 
30 Ibid ., pp . 4- 5; and Leland Baldwin and Robert Keeley, 
The American Nation (third edition; New York: American Book 
Company , 1965) , p . 748 . 
5 . 
3111Campaign Barbs That Won the Votes ••• , " 
32 
Ibid . 
oo . cit ., 
__._ - -
33President Truman ' s St . Louis Address , New York 
Times , October 29 , 1948 . 
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benefit of the common man as proof . Again , as in other 
speeches prior to this one , Truman appealed to the farmer : 
"And I ' ll say to you that any farmer who votes against his 
own interests , that is , who votes the Republican ticket 
ought to have his head examined ." 34 
In the same speech he spoke of the Republican stand 
on labor , specifically the Taft-Hartley Act . The apathetic 
labor turnout at the polls in 1946 was responsible for the 
passage of the Taft- Hartley . If labor did not get behind 
the Democratic ticket in 1948 , the same thing could happen 
again . 35 
Warming to his task , Truman attacked Thomas Dewey , 
his opoonent , and the Eightieth Congress , also his ooponent . 
Of all the fake campaigns this is the tops as 
far as the Republican candidate for President is con -
cerned . He ' s been following me up and down the 
country making speeches about home and mother and 
unity and efficiency and things of that kind . 36 
Then , switching to give equal attack to his other opponent , 
he said : 11 It has worked for the lobby , the worst lobby out-
fit that there ' s ever been in the history of the United 





At the end of the speech , he described the great 
reception he had received in every city in which he had 
visited: 
People are waking up, the tide ' s beginning to 
roll, and I'm here to tell you that if you do your 
duty as citizens of the greatest republic the sun 
has ever shone on , we 'l l have a Government that ' ll 
be for your interests, that'll be for peace in the 
world , and for the welfare of all the people and not 
just a few. 38 
Truman ' s acid oratory had incisively exposed the 
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weaknesses of his opponent and his ability to identify with 
"the people .n 39 
The tactics of Thomas Dewey were exactly the opposite 
of Truman 1 s . He decided not to "rock the boat . 11 He said 
nothing controversial , and his speeches were full of plati -
tudes. The core theme of Dewey ' s speeches was unity , 
a sufficiently safe theme : 
From the Atlantic to the Pacific and back 
again ••. Dewey racked up 16 , 000 miles of cam-
paigning , but the speech delivered at each stop 
carried the same burden : 1We are entered up~n a 
campaign to unite America . We are going to move 
forward to a new unity.'40 
A classic example of a Dewey speech was given early in 
October at Salt Lake City . He opened with a platitude: "We 
38Ibid . 
39Ibid . 
40Louis B. Wright and others , The Democratic Expe-
rience (Chicago: Scott , Foresman and Company , 1963) , p . 435 . 
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will wage peace , we will wage peace with all the vigor and 
the imagination and the skill with which we waged war.n4l 
After this , he promised to : (1) support the United Nations; 
(2) aid freedom- loving people everywhere; (3) encourage the 
European nations to unite; (4) remain strong and get 
stronger ; (5) continue to be a flourishing and vigorous 
nation; and , (7) express in the American foreign policy the 
"ideals , traditions , and aspirations of the American 
people . "42 
As Dewey entered the last week of the campaign, he 
too was extremely confident of winning . On a last campaign 
trip to the East he campaigned more for Republican Senators , 
Congressmen , and Governors than for himself . Returning from 
that last trip , he stayed at home for the final week . He 
was silent and sure of victory . 43 
Immediately before the election , Dewey declared that 
the paramount issue of the campaign was whether the United 
States would be a strong , united nation able to meet "the 
challenge of a dangerous world . "44 Above all other objectives 
41 Governor Dewey ' s Salt Lake City Speech , New York 
Times , October 1 , 1948 . 
42 
Ibid . 
4311Coasting , " Newsweek , XXXII (November 1 , 1948) , 19. 
44Dewey's Speech on the Eve of Election , New York 
Times, November 1, 1948. 
was the building of " a lasting peace in the world upon the 
work of justice and decency . 1145 Dewey closed his campaign 
as he had begun it--with a "give 'em unity" speech . 
Dewey was given , throughout his campaign , the over-
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whelming support of the newspapers across the nation . Even 
from Truman's home state of Missouri , three major newspapers , 
the St . Louis Post- Dispatch , the St . Louis Times , and the 
St . Joseph News- Press (all of which favored Roosevelt in 
1944) , supported Dewey in 1948 . The New York Times , gener-
ally conceded to be the nation ' s leading newspaper , came out 
for Dewey. The New York Post decided that Truman's election 
was undesirable . Opinions similar to this existed across 
the nation . Many Southern journals were expected to oppose 
Truman. A few went even further and supported Dewey . "In 
contrast to the President's ill fortunes , Dewey had not 
suffered ~ single newspaper defection . 1146 
Most of the papers supported Dewey reluctantly , pro-
fessing to believe that Truman could not measure up to the 
rigorous demands of being an effective President . One 
consolation for Truman , however , was that the President made 
the headlines with his sensational blasts at Dewey and the 
45Ibid . 
46 
"Seldom an Encouraging Word , " Newsweek , XXXII 
(November 1 , 1948) , 11 . 
Republican Party. Dewey, on the other hand , proceeded in 
his calm campaign , notable for its lack of headline mater-
. 1 47 1a • 
46 
Not only did Truman have newspaper troubles throughout 
the campaign , but he also lacked money to finance his cam-
paign. The regular Southern contributors , labor unions, 
wealthy New Dealers , Hollywood backers , and wealthy individ-
uals were reluctant to give money to a controversial , if not 
lost , cause. 48 
Examples of Democratic financial difficulties in 1948 
are many . On one occasion , $100 , 000 was needed to pay NBC 
and CBS for network time . The deadline came and the party 
treasury contained only $500 . The Democrats gave Warwick 
and Legler , a New York agency , a check for $100 , 000 late 
Saturday. In turn , Warwick and Legler gave their check to 
the television networks too late to be deposited on Saturday . 
By Monday, the Democrats had raised the $100 , 000 . At one 
time the Truman whistle- stop campaign ran out of money in 
Oklahoma City . Several rich oilmen had to be called on to 
47Ibid . 
48Ernest Lindley , "Democratic Low Ebb , " 212. · cit . , 21; 
and Dumas Malone and Basil Rauch , American and World Leader-
ship (New York : Appleton- Century-Crofts , 1965) , VI, 103 . 
47 
keep the "Truman express" going. On another occasion, Truman 
was cut off the air by the television networks because no 
money was available to pay for overtime.49 
Added to the discouraging factors discussed was the 
fact that the three public opinion polls unanimously predicted 
that Truman could not possibly be re-elected. 50 The May tabu-
lation has already been discussed. At that time, according 
to Gallup, only thirty-six per cent of the voters were for 
51 Truman. 
In April, Newsweek had conducted a less than scien-
tific survey of the Senate. Thirteen senators were committed 
against Truman, twenty-six more were uncommitted, and only 
six were definitely for him.52 Several magazines discounted 
future issues and referred to the Governor of New York as 
53 
"President Dewey." One outstanding example of this was 
Life magazine's caption of November 1, where under a picture 
Dewey boarding a ferry boat, Life said: "The next President 
49Jack Redding, £2• cit., pp. 235, 273, 289. 
50Rexford Tugwell, QQ. cit., pp. 436-437. 
5111 Black and White Beans," QQ. cit., 21. 
52 
"Democrats and Desperation," loc. cit. 
53Lamont Buchanan, Ballot for Americans (New York: 
E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 141, 143. 
48 
travels by ferry boat over the broad waters of San Fran-
. B u54 Cl.SCO ay . 
The three major scientific polls of prediction 
forecast a Truman defeat . Archibald Crossley published 
three nation- wide surveys. One was conducted between August 
6- 15 , another between September 13- 20 , and a final one 
between October 11- 18. The composite in percentage showed 
46 . 8 per cent of the people were for Dewey , while 43 . 6 per 
cent were for Truman , with the other votes distributed 
between Thurmond , Wallace , and the other minor candidates . 55 
In two Gallup surveys-- one conducted between October 
6- 20; the other was completed between October 15- 29--the 
results of the first showed 1 , 186 for Dewey (thirty- eight 
per cent) to 969 (thirty- one per cent ) for Truman. The 
second showed 1 , 175 for Dewey (forty per cent) and 964 for 
Truman (thirty- two per cent) •56 George Gallup , the most 
influential of the three major pollsters, had asked the 
voters : "If the Presidential election were held TODAY, how 
54 Ibid. 
55Frederick Mosteller , The Pre- election Polls of 
1948 (New York: Social Research Council, 1949), pp. 319-
324 . 
56Ibid. 
would you vote--for Dewey, for Truman, for Wallace, for 
57 Thurmond?" to get the results indicated. 
49 
Elmo Roper, another leading pollster, conducted four 
major forecasts. Between July 19-23, the results were 31.5 
per cent for Truman, 46.3 per cent for Dewey. Between 
August 2-7, Truman had 31.4 per cent, Dewey 44.2 per cent. 
Between September 15-18, Truman received 29.7 per cent, 
Dewey 47.9 per cent. His last poll, conducted between 
October 25-28, found Truman with 32.9 per cent to Dewey's 
43.3 per cent.58 
The last published prediction came when the New York 
Times put out an electoral map projecting the outcome of the 
election. The Times predicted that Dewey would get 345 
electoral votes to Truman's 105. Thurmond would receive 
38. Forty-three votes were in the 11 doubtful 11 column.59 
To help sustain this aura of psychological defeat 
for Truman, there were two political maxims that had stood 
the test of years. One, popularly known as Farley's Law, 
declared that the minds of the voters were made up six 
months before the election, and that political campaigning 
57 
Ibid., p. 344. 
58 
Ibid., pp. 344-347. 
59Pre-election Forecast, New York Times, October 31, 
1948. 
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was strictly a ceremonial function. 60 The other maxim was 
that no political party could remain in power indefinitely.61 
According to political experts, these two laws predetermined 
Truman's defeat. 
Truman's election in 1948 was, therefore, one of the 
most stunning upsets in history. When the votes were tabu-
lated, Truman had a popular vote of 24,104,836 (49.5 per 
cent) and an electoral vote of 304. Dewey had a popular vote 
totaling 21,969,500 (45.1 per cent) and an electoral vote 
of 189. Thurmond received 1,000,000 votes and the other 
38 electoral votes.62 
The results were in, but the questions had just 
begun. Why had Truman won despite sure defeat? There were 
many factors contributing to Truman's victory, several of 
them important. There was, first of all, the Truman person-
ality. Everything focused on this as the major explanation 
for the victory. Had Truman been less persevering, less of 
a fighter, he would have given up early in the campaign. 
One hardly becomes a homespun, courageous sensation overnight. 
60 Mosteller, 22· cit., p. 355. 
61 Buchanan, QQ. cit., p. 141. 
62Associated Press Statistics on the 1948 Presidential 
Election, .New York Times, December 11, 1948. 
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The qualities which were the winning ones were not newly 
developed by Truman . As early as 1945 people noticed that 
he was easy for them to identify with . They said that he 
II 
.• instinctively thinks , feels , and acts like the average 
American . u63 His courage and recuperative powers combined 
with his blunt , simple style of oratory are the personality 
characteristics which resulted in victory in 1948: 
He set out to 'tell the people the facts .' He was 
no orator; he stumbled over big words •••• But Harry 
Truman succeeded in dramatizing himself; to millions 
of voters he seemed a simple , sincere man fighting 
against overwhelming odds •••• Few men have been able 
to communicate their personality so completely . He 
never talked down to his audience . He showed no 
shadow or pompousness .••• They knew just how he 
felt.64 
The average man made further comment: 11 ••• Truman 
65 
was for us poor people ." Others spoke of Truman as the 
underdog: "You got to remember he was the underdog . It was 
like in American sports . You always root for the little guy 
who's getting a pushing around from the big one .n66 Truman's 
63Quote from the New York Times and New York Herald 
Tribune , October 31 , 194s;-and "Congress and President Truman 
March Forward ," The Congr·essional Digest , XXIV (June , 1945) , 
161. 
64 
"Fighter in a Fighting Year ," Time , LIII (January 3 , 
1945) ' 64 . 
65 
"Truman--Reasons for Victory," New York Times Maga-
zine, XCVIII (November 28 , 1948) , 1 , 63 . 
66Meyer Berger , "Reasons for Victory ," New York Times , 
November 4 , 1948 . 
affiliation with the average man can be summed up in this 
way: "President Roosevelt used to talk about the common 
man--but President Tr uman is a common man ." 67 This asset 
was invaluable in the campaign of 1948 . 
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Howard McGrath , in a post- election statement , almost 
discounted the Truman personality as a reason for his vic-
tory . He felt that the problems inside the Eightieth Congress 
had caused the victory : 
The Republican Eightieth Congress may well have 
been the deciding factor in the election •••• With -
out the performance of the Republican Congress , 
Dewey might possibly have been electect . 68 
Although McGrath was generalizing his statement , there was 
an element of truth in it . An important tactic of the Truman 
strategy was connecting Dewey with the record of the Eight-
ieth Congress . Truman hit hard at the Congress . The fact 
that he had controversial issues to attack also made his 
campaign more telling . 69 
Another important factor in the Truman victory was 
his opponent's campaign . In a press conference after his 
67Ibid . 
68 Howard McGrath ' s Comments , New York Times , November 
1 , 1948 . 
69 
Roper Still Seeks Answers on Polls , New York Times , 
November 8 , 1948 ; Redding , 2£· cit ., p . 184; "Truffian:-
Reasons for Victory , " loc . cit ., and "Truman Sweep ," New 
York Times , November 7 , 1948 . 
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victory , Truman was awar e that the Republican Par ty's blun-
der s had helped him and brought down the house by saying 
that he thought his opponent was the greatest asset he had . 70 
This , of cour se , was an over- simplification used for humorous 
effect , but there was an element of truth in the statement . 
Some Republicans thought that Dewey would have done better 
if he had not depended on a small gr oup of Albany politicians 
to do his thinking for him. These men believed a profes-
sional politician such as Rober t Taft would have done a 
better job . Truman ' s reiteration of New Deal policies was 
also cited as a reason for h i s victory . People complained 
of the Dewey personality , Republican over- confidence , the 
failure of Republicans to vote , and the " smug , supercillious 
campaign" conducted by the Republicans . 71 
Governor Dewey himself blamed as a major factor in his 
defeat over confidence and failure among many Republicans to 
vote because they thought him a certain winner . 72 
70Arthur Krock , "Why Dewey Lost , " New York Times 
November 12, 1948, p . 22 ; and V. 0 . Key , Jr ., Politics , 
Parties , and Pressure Groups (fifth edition; New York: 
Thomas J . Crowell Company , 1964) , p . 484 . 
71 Robert G. Whalen , "Our Forecast : What Went Wrong?" 
New York Times , November 7 , 1948; "Tr uman--Reasons for Vic -
tory ," loc . cit .; and Thomas A. Bailey , The American Pagenat 
(second edition; Boston : D. C. Hearst and Co ., 1962) , p . 922. 
72 
Buddington Kelland , Comments on the 1948 Election , 
New York Times , November 16 , 1948 . 
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Statistics showed huge contrasts in the amount of time and 
energy each candidate spent getting votes. Dewey campaigned 
for six weeks, made 110 speeches, and covered 16,000 miles 
on his campaign trail. Truman campaigned for eight weeks, 
made 271 speeches, and covered 22,000 miles in his campaign. 
Truman's hard work paid off.73 
Whatever can be said about Republican tactics during 
the campaign, it is evident that the Dewey failure in 1948 
was due partially to the Republican Party's failure to use 
the issues of the day to its advantage, and the evidence of 
a general apathy toward the election among many Republican 
voters. 74 
The personalities of Dewey and Truman were definitely 
a factor in the campaign, but it is difficult to measure 
precisely how much the personality traits and tactics were 
responsible for the Truman victory. A more concrete evi-
dence of victory can be seen in the influence labor had in 
in the 1948 campaign. President Truman had one explanation 
that was obviously a generalization, but significant none-
theless. He said: " L b d"d "t t~75 • . • a or 1 1 • • • • Labor 
73 ( Raymond Moley, "Presidency," Newsweek, XXXII Novem-
ber 17, 1948), 16. 
74 
"The Republic: For Once Without Shouting," Newsweek, 
XXXII (November 8, 1948), 22-23. 
75 Truman Sweep, loc. cit. 
resented the Taft- Hartley Act . Truman had vetoed the Act . 
Therefore , America ' s working man in the long run voted for 
Truman despite the fact that he did not think Truman could 
win . Labor members turned out in large numbers to vote 
against the Taft -Hartley Act , and in the process helped 
carry Truman into office . 76 
In assessing the results of the 1948 election , one 
55 
farmer said : "I wasn't voting for a man or a party . I was 
voting for the price of wheat . 11 77 This farm vote was another 
important factor in the Truman victory . The farmers were 
content to stay with an administration that had been good to 
them rather than to risk their prosperity on a gamble with 
the Republican Party: 
The farmers balanced the gains they had made 
under the Democratic administration against Dewey's 
promises . In the struggle between their pocketbooks 
and their ingrained conservatism, their pocketbooks 
won out. Dewey's margin in the farm areas was too 
slim to carry him to victory.78 
7611 Truman--Reasons for Victory , " loc. cit.; "Fighter 
in a Fighting Year , " loc . cit.; and "By Harry Truman: Cam-
paign Barbs That Won the Votes ••• , " 2.£ · cit. , 5. 
7711 Fighter in a Fighting Year , " loc. cit . 
78
"Significance of the 1948 Campaign , " Newsweek, XXXII 
(November 8 , 1948) , 7; "Fighter in a Fighting Year," loc . 
cit.; "Truman Sweep , " loc . cit . ; "By Harry Truman: Campaign 
Barbs That Won the Votes • •• , " loc . cit . ; and Samuel 
Lubell , The Future of American PoTitics-TNew York: Harper 
and Brothers , 1951) --, pp . 160- 161 . 
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A final factor in the victory need only be mentioned 
briefly. Three states , Ohio , Minnesota, and Illinois, held 
the balance of the election . Were it not for the sweeping 
victories of Governor Frank Lausche of Ohio , Senator Hubert 
Humphrey of Minnesota, and Senator Paul Douglas and Governor 
Adlai Stevenson of Illinois , all of Truman's hard work plus 
the labor and farm vote might not have been enough to win 
the election . 79 
It is evident that there was no one reason for Tru-
man's victory . There were several , including Dewey's 
personality , Truman's effective campaign , and the ability 
of Truman to garner a large part of the farm and labor 
vote . 
79 
Truman Sweep , loc . cit. 
CHAPTER IV 
PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND THE ELECTION 
When the reasons for the Truman victory were formu-
lated, only half the picture of the 1948 Presidential 
election was completed. If possible, the question, "how 
could everyone, amateur and expert alike , be so unanimous 
in their prediction of defeat for Harry Truman in 1948?" 
must be answered in order to understand the election of 1948. 
The press played a large part in the prediction of 
Truman's defeat. The New York Times made a comprehensive 
survey on the eve of the election and forecast an over-
whelming electoral victory for Dewey . After the election 
proved it wrong, the Times attempted to explain why its 
prediction had erred . One reason the correspondents missed 
on their prediction was because they listened to the old-
line political experts in the various states. These 
politicians had followed elections for years, and almost 
without exception , these men predicted a Dewey victory . 
The correspondents took the views of these "old pros" at 
face value, without attempting to investigate the matter 
for themselves . Many of the Times correspondents decided 
that if the Democrats did not think they could win, then 
there must be no hope for a Truman victory. 
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Not only did many correspondents accept the views 
of the politicians, they spent too much time talking among 
themselves. All that this accomplished was the solidification 
of preconceived opinions. They did not spend time asking the 
people what they thought about the election because the cor-
respondents had their minds made up in advance. Likewise, 
they dismissed the large crowds that attended Truman's 
speeches as curiosity seekers. The correspondents spent 
their time in the office when they should have been out 
among the people.1 
The correspondents manifested almost identical poli-
tical tendencies; therefore, they failed to make a correct 
forecast in 1948. Tradition indicated that no party could 
stay in office forever. Many correspondents believed that 
the odds had finally caught up with the Democrats, and the 
belief was strengthened by the might of the GOP trend (which 
had begun in 1938 and had been carried to its apex in the 
1946 Congressional elections). Most political experts 
believed that the Democrats had suffered such crushing defeat 
in 1946 that they could not possibly win in 1948. They 
pointed to the vote-getting power of Dewey (23,000,000 
1 Robert G. Whalen, "Our Forecast: What Went Wrong?" 
New York Times, November 7, 1948, p. 4E. 
popular votes) in 1944 against Roosevelt as compared to 
Truman's declining popularity and utter lack of political 
influence evidenced in the 1946 elections. Reporters in 
several states based their predictions on traditional GOP 
strength, or on controversial regional contests that were 
supposed to bring out the Republican vote. Many thought 
that Dewey was so strong that he could carry himself and 
many weaker GOP candidates to victory.2 
The press went wrong also, in that it depended as 
heavily on the public opinion polls. The Times correspon-
dents, instead of interviewing people, quoted statistics 
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as compiled by the leading polling organizations.3 Scien-
tific opinion polls had enjoyed twelve years of unchallenged 
success and had come to be regarded as practically infal-
lible. Congressmen, reporters, magazine editors, and the 
average man-in-the-street depended upon the polls to do 
their political thinking for them. The scientific polls 
were supposed to be much more reliable than the "amateurs." 
Yet Gallup, Roper, and Crossley did no better than the 
press or any other amateur forecaster. 
By 1948, the art of polling had been taken out of 





to report statistics, the polls had become involved in a mad 
race conducted by the news media to get a "beat" on how 
the election was going to come out. There was a danger of 
vested interests taking over polling and using it for some 
selfish end. Because of their probable misuse, many people 
believed that all sorts of public forecasts should be elimi-
nated as a possible danger to the legitimate use of the 
powers of persuasion. 4 
If a large part of the responsibility for the predicted 
defeat for Truman in 1948 can be traced to the opinion polls, 
a short history of the polls themselves will cast some light 
upon the reasons for their failure. First, the scientific 
public opinion polls were not initiated to predict elections, 
but rather to help companies to sell their products. Before 
the polls, companies used a process known as market analysis 
in which process a manufacturer who wanted to test public 
reaction to a new product paid representatives to go out and 
ask people about their reaction to the product. This method 
was unwieldy and expensive, and attempts were made to dis-
cover an easier and cheaper way to find out the public's 
opinion about certain products. They discovered that one 
hundred people in a certain income bracket living in ten 
cities could be sampled easier than one thousand people in 
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one city , and that the results were more conclusive . Dr . 
George Gallup and Elmo Roper , both pioneers in this process 
which came to be known as "quota sampling , " became directors 
of prosperous institutes of research . 
As practiced by the pollsters , the process of quota 
sampling involved four basic steps. (1) It was necessary 
that the sample be typical of the area where the polling was 
being done . (2) The population in the area polled was 
divided into categories-- age , religion , race , education , 
social levels , and economic status . It endeavored to be 
representative of all the factions within a community . 
Even though only a small number of persons were polled in 
quota sampling , they adequately represented the majority of 
people in the area , if the sample was properly conducted . 
(3) Interviewers contacted the selected representative 
individuals within a specific environment . They used ques -
tions prepared in advance by the sponsoring organization , 
i . e ., Gallup , Roper , or Crossley . The interviewers them-
selves were not full time e~ployees . They were temporary 
employees who received approximately eighty- five cents an 
hour for their job. They generally came from a middle class 
environment and included a cross section of professional 
workers- - teachers , reporters , and lawyers . Their training 
usually consisted of on- the - job supervision for a short 
period of time. Gallup's organization had one thousand 
three hundred interviewers, Roper's two hundred fifty-six. 
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The average interview lasted from ten to fifteen minutes. 
(4) The preparation of questionnaires and their subsequent 
evaluation was the most crucial part of the process. The 
questions asked had to be tactful, economical, and yet able 
to elicit the proper responses. When these four steps were 
completed, the data had to be processed, evaluated, and 
publicized. 5 
The pollsters turned to election forecasting in order 
to have a national testing ground for various sampling meth-
ods. They enjoyed immediate success. In the Presidential 
elections of 1936, 1940, and 1944, they successfully pre-
dieted the winning candidates. Because of this success, 
the public opinion polls came to be known as scientifically 
reliable.6 
The election of 1948 exposed the pollsters as vul-
nerable in several ways despite the number of people 
interviewed. In a two-month period before the 1948 elec-
tion, Dr. Gallup interviewed over 60,000 people. Roper's 
organization simultaneously conducted 5,200 interviews. 
5Cabell Phillips, "And the Polls: What Went Wrong?" 
New York Times, November 7, 1948, p. 4E. 
6Ibid. 
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After the election , the pollsters immediately began to 
re- evaluate their method of quota sampling . They had their 
interpretation of why they failed in 1948 . First , all of 
the polls were confronted with a per centage of people who 
answered certain questions "undecided" or "no opinion . " 
This type ranged from eighteen per cent to seven and one- half 
per cent in the campaign of 1948. The pollster s decided 
because of previous experience with the "undecided" to dis -
tribute their theoretical vote among the candidates . This 
was a highly unscientific process at best , involving guess-
work and a naive belief that the people with "no opinion" or 
people "undecided'' about how to vote would divide proportion-
ately with those who expressed definite opinions . They also 
knew that they had miscalculated the "intensity" of the 
voters . (Until some method is devised to measure the degree 
of determination of the voter to carry through a stated 
course of action , the polls will be an unreliable indicator 
of public opinion) . Interviews were weak . The scientific 
process in polling broke down at this point . Both the inter-
viewer and the one interviewed were human and , therefore , 
subject to prejudice . Also , the average interviewer was 
only casually trained for his job and was allowed a broad 
area of discretion in choosing whom he would interview. He 
tended to interview people from his own class and therefore 
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fails to get an adequate cross section of beliefs and ideas 
from which come scientifically interpreted results . 
Margin of error (four per cent) is but arbitrarily 
designated by the pollsters. In a close election it is 
almost impossible to accurately predict the winner . The 
result is , at best , only guesswork . In the 1948 election 
the margin of error was even more than four per cent as 
indicated by the chart below: 
% of 
Gallup Roper Crossley Ave . Voters Error 
Truman 44 . 5 37 . 5 45 . 0 42. 3 50 . 0 18.1 
Dewey 49 . 5 52. 8 50 . 1 50 . 8 45 . 6 10 . 1 
Wallace 4.0 4 . 4 3.3 3 . 9 2. 4 39.2 
Thurmond 2. 0 5 . 3 1.6 3.0 2.0 33.2 
It is now evident that seemingly irrelevant factors 
can profoundly affect a Presidential election. An example 
of an outside factor is the birth control issue in Massa -
chusetts which brought out many Irish- Catholic , Democratic 
voters who might otherwise have stayed at home . Intangible 
factors such as apathy on the part of Republican voters and 
renewed determination to 11 go down fighting 11 by the Democrat 
organization , affected the 1948 campaign in a significant 
way , yet could not be predicted in advance . The conclusions 
7 Harold Isaacs , "How, Why and Whither , 11 Newsweek , 
XXXII (November 29 , 1948) , 26. 
7 
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that can be drawn about the polling process , as illustrated 
by the election of 1948 , show that such methods are compli -
cated; therefore , i t will probably be many years before the 
processes can be refined enough to be termed scientific . 8 
The findings of the average man , the pollsters , news 
correspondents , and magazine editor s may all be considered 
non- scientific opinions , most of them associated with pr eju-
dice of some sort and all of them produced with a small 
amount of investigation involved . Such , however , was not 
the case with the impartial investigation of the 1948 Presi-
dential election which was conducted by the Social Science 
Research Council . This group pr oduced its report on Decem-
ber 27 , 1948. The pollsters and other leading sources of 
findings turned their information over to the Social Science 
Research Council who , in turn , appointed a committee to find 
out exactly why the public opinion polls had been so far 
"off base" in their predictions in 1948. The members of the 
committee ranged from Harvard and Yale professors to the 
president of a television network . In addition to the com-
mittee proper , a staff was appointed to gather and analyze 
data and prepare a preliminary report . 9 
8Letter to the Editor of the New York Times , November 
20, 1948. -------
9News item in the New York Times , November 18 , 1948 . 
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The committee studied polling and decided to follow 
an eight- step process : (1) establish a proper sample by 
including a cross section of voters in the sample; (2) pre-
pare an effective questionnaire and train the interviewer 
in the proper method of presenting and correcting the ques -
tionnaire; (3) take care in the selection of the people to 
be interviewed ; (4) be objective in interviewing technique; 
(5) decide how many of the people interviewed will actually 
vote ; (6) decide what should be done with the people who 
are "undecided" and those who are of " no opinion ; " (7) 
process the data correctly (this will include adjustments 
and corrections) and , (8) devise a method to interpret and 
present the results . lO 
After personnel were selected and a process was 
adopted , the staff began to investigate polling results 
from the three major public opinion polls . The polls had 
not only made surveys during the 1948 election , they had 
also presented the results to the public via newspapers and 
radio . How had they represented their findings? Had 
they printed cold , hard statistics without confusing quali -
fications or had they released spiced descriptions to make 
1
°Frederick Mosteller , The Pre-election Polls of 1948 
(New York : Social Science Research Council , 1949) , p-.-3-.---
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accounts newsworthy , but inaccurate. 11 To answer these 
questions involves a look at newspapers which publicized 
the results of the pre- election predictions . For example , 
Roper's polling service always suggested a headline for the 
newspapers to use; however, the suggested headline was 
rarely used . Newspapers often dramatized or distorted the 
polling results by the substitution of a sensational head-
line . Parts of reports submitted by the pollsters were 
sometimes omitted to save space . This sometimes caused dis-
tortions of the reports.l2 
Most of the time , there was a lapse between the time 
the poll was taken and the time the results were publicly 
announced . Unless the exact date of the poll was announced 
when publicized , there would be a distortion of the results 
in the minds of the public . Here , the polling organizations 
were at fault . They seldom provided the news media with 
exact dates on which their polls were taken . They "got 
around" giving this information by : (1) telling when the 
poll - taking had ended , but provided no information about its 
beginning date; (2) they stated that the release contained 
no suggested date of termination; (3) or they casually 
11Ibid ., p . 29 . 
12Ibid ., pp . 34- 36 . 
mentioned the period when the poll was taken, causing the 
date to look insignificant.l3 
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Not only did the reporters of poll opinions fail to 
report when polls were taken, they often failed to report 
the sizes and variability factors of samples used. The size 
of the sample was never indicated by the pre-election polls 
in 1948. The variability of the sample was only occasion-
ally presented. Crossley ignored the variability factors 
in the first of his releases and inserted a phrase such as 
"normal mathematical limitations of results taken from 
samples of the population" 14 in five out of his last seven 
releases. The Gallup organization referred to variability 
in two special releases, but not in thirty-nine regular 
releases. Roper made only one mention of variability.l5 
The success of the entire polling operation depends 
on the sampling method and the cross section which it 
yields. Crossley made only one mention of composition. 
Gallup mentioned it in two special releases. Roper did 
not mention it at all. To understand the responses made 
within the poll, the public should be aware of the questions 
asked. Gallup was the only one of the three polling 
14Ibid., p. 36. 
15Ibid., pp. 36-38. 
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agencies who published the list of his questions for the 
public to see. All of the "big three" were vague on adjust-
ments they made in the interpretation of data . None 
indicated a process of analysis . 16 
Because many uncertainties are connected with the art 
of polling as peoples' views change from day to day , in 
publicizing the results of their findings the polls should 
not state dogmatically what is happening . At best , they 
can only state what might happen. The uncertainty of the 
pollsters should be indicated in their press releases . This 
can be done in special ways . (l) A simple sentence can be 
used to describe the sample or the population which a sample 
represents . (2) Every verb describing polling can be put 
into the past tense to indicate that the press release can 
be applied only to the time period when the sample was 
taken . (3) A press release can be qualified by using 
adverbs such as "probably" or a verb such as "seems . " Not 
one of the three described the sample of population its 
poll represented . Crossley was the only pollster who wrote 
in past tense, and the Crossley organization only used quali -
fiers in forty- seven per cent of its releases . l7 
16Ibid., p. 39 . 
17Ibid ., p . 50 . 
Investigations of the press releases of Crossley, 
Gallup, and Roper indicate that the three major polls used 
journalistic rather than scientific methods to publicize 
their findings. They failed to describe what process they 
used or to indicate the limitation of their particular 
process. Failing to inform the public , they distorted 
their findings.l8 This was one major conclusion of the 
Social Science Research Council. 
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Next the committee turned to the problem of measuring 
the error that came from the very fact that the survey was 
a public opinion survey . The variability involved in pre-
dicting the electoral vote in a Presidential election was 
recognized. The average beginning margin of error was set 
at three percentage points . This omitted errors on the 
state level which would have made the percentage of error 
much higher . The closest that the poll - takers could pos-
sibly get to a specific estimate of Truman's electoral vote 
would have been to have said that he would get anywhere 
from 234 to 298 electoral votes . With such variability 
in estimates of the electoral vote, it seems unreasonable 
to expect that polling organizations could predict the 
electoral vote to any satisfactory degree of accuracy. If 
a polling organization cannot be expected to predict the 
18Ibid ., p . 73. 
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electoral vote very accurately , it is unreasonable to expect 
the winner of a Presidential election to be accurately pre -
dieted . Even if the pollsters could predict the popular 
vote to a certain extent the electoral vote wins the Presi-
dential elections . 19 
Most studies do not try to allow for or explain the 
change from forty- nine to fifty- one per cent that is so 
important a variation band in predicting the electoral vote . 
Systematic errors of at least three per cent are common in 
elections . Here is a table showing the hypothetical situ-
ation of only two parties running in 1948 and the possibility 
of making a correct prediction with systematic error involved: 
Systematic error toward 




















The committee examined the use of cr oss sections in 
the pre- election polls . All three major polls used the 
quota sampling method . One way to describe this method is 
to imagine that there are 1 , 000 beans in a barrel , 700 of the 
beans being white, while the other 300 beans are black. If 
19 
Ibid . 
20Ibid ., p . 77 . 
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a person scoops up 100 beans from this barrel, he should 
get approximately 70 white and 30 black beans. The range 
of the possible error can be computed mathematically. As 
long as the barrel contains a significant amount of beans, 
the proportion should remain within the mathematical margin 
of error 997 times out of 1,000 . The pollster's true prob-
lem was threefold. (1) He had to work out the true ratios 
involved in determining the composition of the "barrel;" 
(2) he had to choose his respondents (persons interviewed) 
carefully; and, (3) he had to be sure that the ratio that 
he had worked out and the respondents he had chosen to be 
interviewed corresponded exactly.21 
Several weaknesses in the quota sampling process can 
be observed. In the 1948 election , the samples were repre-
sentative of the 1948 vote in the sections from which they 
were drawn. All three major polls under- represented the 
lower class in their polls . It was assumed that since the 
educated higher class usually turns out to vote in a higher 
proportion than the lower class , the former should be more 
heavily interviewed. It is unlikely that proper results 
could ever have been obtained since this assumption was 
2111 The Black and White Beans," Time, LI (May 3, 1948), 
21. 
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followed . Finally , ther e was a large systematic error in 
the 1948 election . This more than anything else is respon-
sible for the distor tion in the final results . 22 Although 
statistical evidence is not available to measure how much 
the quota sampling method contributed to unpredictable (sys-
tematic) err ors involved in the 1948 election pr edictions , 
there was a great amount of systematic error . 
It may well have been due to the fallibility of the 
interviewers or respondents that there was in the 1948 
sampling system. The committee concluded: "The mere fact 
that the measurements cannot be made is itself a serious 
weakness of the method . II 23 
An investigation into the interviewer and his influ -
ence must necessarily be scanty , for statistical information 
regarding this element is not abundant . The committee tried 
to evaluate them by examining : (1) race , class , and poli-
tical composition of interviewers ; (2) evaluating attempts 
to control bias ; (3) determining how to measure cheating ; 
(4) estimating how well the interviewer did on the job ; 
(5) and re - evaluating interviewers' training practices. The 
committee concluded that the reason that nothing concrete 
22Frederick Mosteller , QQ. cit ., pp . 113- 115 . 
23 . Ib1d ., pp . 115- 116 . 
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could be said about this area was because pollster and sta-
tistical expert alike had neglected this area of study. 
Pollsters and students of polling were to be blamed because 
of their lack of study in this important area of polling. 24 
The questionnaire itself presented as many problems 
to the council as the questioner and questioned did. The 
area of questionnaire design is a complex one. Basically, 
this area can be broken down into three sections: (1) How 
well does the questionnaire elicit a person's true desire 
to carry through and actually vote for the person the respon-
dent has outwardly declared himself to be for? (2) How well 
does the questionnaire allow for the uncommitted voter? 
(3) Does the questionnaire adequately cover the question 
of eligibility of voters? It can be readily seen that the 
preparation of questionnaires to measure the psychological 
committment of, for example, a person's intention to vote, 
must be haphazard at best. The questionnaires can be tech-
nically perfect, which incidentally, they were not in 1948, 
and there will still be room for error. 25 
When all of the other steps are taken, processing and 
adjusting of the data follow. As can be seen from a study 
24 
Ibid., p. 148. 
25Ibid., pp. 153-162. 
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of the different steps involved in the process of poll-
taking , by the time the process reached the final stage in 
the 1948 Presidential election , crucial errors had already 
been made . Even if the pollsters had correctly evaluated 
their data and processed it thoroughly , adjusting as they 
went , the results would have been inaccurate simply because 
of the errors already latent in the process . To complicate 
matters , the pollster s stopped polling in the last two or 
three weeks before the election , thereby missing the last-
minute swing to Truman . This meant their failure in 
adequately measuring the undecided votes . 26 
Preliminary observations prepared by the staff of the 
committee on analysis of the pr e- election polls and forecasts 
are as follows : (1) The pollsters took on too large a task 
when they attempted to predict the winner of the 1948 Presi-
dential election . Such a prediction could only be an 
educated guess . (2) The pollsters could have predicted a 
closer contest if they had studied their data more care-
fully . (3) Polling process is complex , involving eight 
crucial steps . The pollsters erred most in sampling and 
interviewing techniques, publicizing results , predicting 
behavior of undecided voters , and accounting for the 
26Ibid. , pp. 174- 244 . 
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last-minute swing to Truman . (4) The errors were due to 
the same things as in previous elections , but the errors 
''showed" more in the 1948 election because it was a close 
one . (5) Error existed at every step of the polling pro -
cess . (6) The publicizing of polling results distorted 
facts . This needs to be corrected. (7) Polling should not 
be scorned by the public . Occasional failures , like the one 
in 1948, do not cancel out the value of polling . However , 
in the 1948 Presidential election , evidence presented proves 
that the polls were inaccurate in creating the almost total 
aura of defeat they predicted for Truman . 27 
The conclusions drawn by the committee proper were 
these: (1) the errors in 1948 were not much different than 
in previous years , but this discovery should not have reduced 
interest in pollsters' trying to find a way to eliminate 
errors involved in election forecasting; (2) quota sampling , 
as used by the major polls , is not superior to persistence 
prediction; 28 (3) techniques are not varied , and therefore 
will repeat themselves; (4) basic research of poll-taking 
itself must be undertaken , and every part of the polling 
27Ibid ., pp . 290- 291 . 
28Persistence prediction states that conditions will 
repeat themselves . What happened last year is likely to 
happen again . 
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process itself must be examined and radically improved before 
the pollsters can again make election forecasts with confi-
dence; (5) in the past , the pollsters have failed to educate 
the public about the margin of error involved in polling . 
Instead , they have taken undue credit for what they have 
done . Now they are reaping an equally undue amount of 
criticism about their polling process . 29 
29 Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky , Presidential 
Elections : Strategies of American Electoral Politics (New 
York : Charles Scribner ' s Sons , 1964) , pp . 137- 138 . 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
The Truman-Dewey Presidential contest was marked by 
distorted predictions . When Truman took office in 1945 , he 
was well - liked because of his honest and homespun person-
ality. Soon , however , this evaluation became a detriment 
to him . The public compared him with Roosevelt , and the 
contrast between the two was obvious . Roosevelt ' s name 
and personality were famous; Truman was an unknown; there-
fore , the Presidency was Truman ' s , but the office's dignity 
still belonged to Roosevelt . Truman was handicapped in 
implementing the policies of his predecessor. He felt that 
he must pay obeisance to the Roosevelt version of the New 
Deal; and , because of this , he was to be handicapped . His 
inactivity in decision- making caused a "bewildered'' tag to 
be placed upon his early administration. 
The Congressional elections of 1946 provided an early 
turning point toward the Truman victory in 1948. Superfi -
cially , the 1946 Republican victory seemed to indicate that 
the Democrats were hopelessly divided , and that the Repub-
licans were gaining , politically speaking . Actually , the 
1946 Republican victory proved to be a "shot in the arm'' for 
President Truman. Observers considered the 1946 elections 
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in Congress as a repudiati on of Roosevelt ' s New Deal as 
administered by Roosevelt. From 1946 to 1948 , Truman was 
expected to initiate a program of his own to replace Roose -
velt's which he had been trying frantically to keep in 
effect. For the first time , he took the offensive in poli-
tical affairs ; therefore , it may be said that the 1946 
election transformed Truman from a follower to a leader . 
To most observers , however , Truman ' s new policies in 1946 
and 1947 seemed to be leading the Democratic Party down the 
road to disaster. The President took a strong stand on 
civil rights and vetoed the Taft-Hartley Act . He advocated 
a "get tough policy" in regard to Russia , and supported 
economic price controls . It is hard to say whether Truman 
so acted with a political motive in mind , but whatever his 
intentions may have been , most of these maneuvers contri-
buted to his victory in 1948. The veto of the Taft-Hartley 
Act gained much support from labor. The stand on price 
controls gained a good part of the farm vote . His stand on 
civil rights alienated part of the South , but gained many 
liberal votes . Ironically , the homespun Truman personality 
which gained him the title of "muddler" in 1946 was to 
become the chief factor in the Truman victory in 1948 . The 
very factors that contributed to the pessimistic attitude of 
most forecasters in 1946 were key factors in the Truman 
victory two years later. 
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Just before the convention , in early 1948 , the odds 
against a Truman victory increased again . Henry Wallace 
announced his candidacy for President on the Progressive 
ticket . He was expected to draw as many as ten million 
votes from the Democratic fold . The South opposed Truman 
and threatened to vote in a bloc for Strom Thurmond , 11 Dixie-
crat11 candidate for President . Most indicative of the mood 
of the political experts was the "draft Eisenhower" movement 
that took place in June of 1948 because the Democratic Party 
did not think that Truman could win re - election . They began 
a rather desperate search for a suitable candidate . Eisen-
hower refused to be drafted. If the Democrats did not want 
to support Truman , what hope was there for a Truman victory 
in November? 
The Republicans nominated Thomas Dewey , a candidate 
they considered a safe one to oppose Truman in 1948. Dewey's 
record as District Attorney and Governor of New York, and 
his proven nation-wide vote- getting ability (23 , 000 , 000 
popular votes against Roosevelt in 1944) qualified him as 
a strong Truman opponent . 
With reluctance , Truman was renominated at the Demo-
cratic National Convention in early July . He set the 
pattern for his campaign which followed with a firey 
acceptance speech . The highlight of the speech was 
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Truman ' s announcement that he was calling the Eightieth 
Congress back into session so that they could do the things 
their platform said they stood for . The move was obviously 
a political one . The "Turnip Day Maneuver" was denounced 
at the time but proved to be quite effective. The tactic 
successfully linked Governor Dewey with the "do- nothing" 
Eightieth Congress and gave Truman something to attack . 
Truman developed a major means of delivering that 
attack in his chaotic "give 'em Hell" campaign. He had 
something to prove to the people. If he had not found some 
way to attract the public ' s attention and obtain their sym-
pathy , there would have been little chance for his victory. 
The campaign tactics fitted the Truman personality . He was 
an average middle - class American who understood the "common 
man." He was at his best when speaking extemporaneously . 
He was not a polished orator , and it would have been diffi -
cult for him to conduct a dignified , orderly campaign. It 
had been demonstrated in 1945 that Truman had little talent 
to implement someone else ' s program. He was at his best 
when on the offensive , and his campaign in 1948 was a vivid 
example of this . 
Thomas Dewey , on the other hand , conducted a ••safe" 
campaign . Dewey later was much maligned for playing into 
Truman's hands by allowing him to make the issues , while 
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Dewey spoke of unity , God , and country . Yet , this was sound 
strategy in 1948 . Being the favorite , Dewey felt that if he 
took the offensive , he might alienate some conservative 
Republican voters while gaining nothing from the Indepen-
dents and Democrats . Most critics agree that the basic 
fault in the Dewey campaign lay in his overconfidence and 
cold personality . Dewey did not campaign hard enough 
because he felt that he could not lose . Being opposite to 
Truman personality- wise proved to be a detriment to his 
victory. 
The farmers also played an important part in the 
Republican defeat . The Democratic New Deal which had been 
good to the farmers caused them to be reluctant to change 
loyalties . Labor supported Truman because he vetoed the 
Taft-Hartley Act . These two groups provided Truman with the 
votes necessary to offset the loss of part of the South 
and the Wallace votP. . 
Practically no one correctly predicted the election 
outcome . In campaign days news correspondents and other 
political observers took the ''easy way out . " They let the 
polls do their thinking for them. The polls were largely 
responsible for the creation of the consensus that Truman 
would lose in 1948. 
They all predicted an unqualified Dewey victory. 
Even though the polls were widely accepted as scientific 
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measurement of established opinion , they proved to be 
unscientific. They attempted to simplify a complex pro-
cess . The result was a prediction that was little better 
than a calculated guess . Furthermore , the polls attempted 
virtually an impossible task --that of objectively publi -
cizing their polling results . They were caught in the 
pressure to make newsworthy items of their polling results. 
Because of this , the pollsters made unqualified predictions 
that they were unable to substantiate. It was possible to 
get away with this during the Roosevelt years because the 
elections were not close; however , when a close election 
came , their errors were spotlighted and their incompetence 
was shown. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the pollsters' 
mistakes . First of all , the process of polling in elections 
does have great potential and should not entirely be ignored. 
In using them , it should be remembered that they are not 
totally reliable. Their influence on public opinion is 
unquestioned . Particularly was this true in 1948 . The 
danger exists even today that unscrupulous persons could 
shape public opinion with carefully prepared polls . Perhaps 
a more scientific use of polls , for example conducting them 
for predictions but not publicizing them as truth , would 
be a more accurate use of them . As they are used , in 
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either way , it should be remembered that people are unpre-
dictable. No one has yet been able to map out the mind of 
the individual in black and white. Whatever else can be 
said , the Presidential election of 1948 verified this fact. 
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Many periodicals , books , and newspapers described 
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the events that made up the Truman victory in 1948 . The 
Truman Presidency by Cabell Phillips , The Pre- election Polls 
of 1948 , prepared by the Social Science Research Council , 
and news items from the New York Times were particularly 
valuable . 
Several factors made the Truman victory in 1948 
unique . Never had a Presidential candidate for re- election 
faced more formidable odds against victory . Upon taking 
office in 1945 , Truman was compared with Franklin D. Roose -
velt who had been regarded as a great President. Truman 
was considered to be an incompetent bungler by the loyal 
followers of Roosevelt . 
The Congressional elections of 1946 seemed to confirm 
the opinion of the New Dealers . Truman ' s popularity was at 
an all - time low, and discontent was high among the public. 
However , the repudiation of the Truman version of the New 
Deal turned out to be a blessing in disguise . The Con-
gressional defeat required Truman to come up with a program 
of his own . Truman took the initiative by creating a strong 
civil rights program , vetoing the Taft- Hartley bill, and 
taking a strong stand on pr ice controls . 
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By early 1948 , the majority of political experts 
considered the chances of a Truman victory as next to 
nothing . Henry Wallace , a former Democratic president under 
Roosevelt , became alarmed over Truman ' s "get tough" policy 
with Russia and bolted the party to run for President on 
the Progressive ticket . He was expected to take numerous 
popular votes away from Truman . In addition , Truman had 
alienated the South with a strong stand on civil rights . 
Early in 1948 , it looked as though Truman might lose a good 
portion of the Democratic "solid South . " The worst blow 
to the Truman campaign was the "draft Eisenhower" move-
ment . Many New Dealers and other disaffected liberals 
decided that Truman was unfit to run for President and 
attempted to draft General Dwight D. Eisenhower , a political 
novice , for the job. The movement gained momentary appeal 
until Eisenhower stopped the clamor with an unqualified 
repudiation of the "draft Ike" organization . 
Truman was renominated with reluctance at the 
Democratic Convention in July . Very few gave him much 
of a chance for victory in November . Truman began his cam-
paign of desperation by calling the Eightieth Congress back 
into session . This political move was criticized by the 
press , but focused the eyes of the nation on the Republican 
"do nothing" Congress . Truman's fighting tactics caught 
the imagination of the public . In addition to attacking 
Congress , he attacked his opponent ' s "me too'' campaign and 
insinuated that a vote for the Republicans was a vote 
against prosperity and the common man . Despite his ener-
getic campaign , Truman was still rated at the bottom by 
the pollsters , who all predicted a Dewey landslide . 
When the results were in , Truman had accomplished 
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the biggest upset in American political history by defeating 
Thomas Dewey . Truman ' s effective campaign , combined with 
Republican overconfidence , were deciding factors in the 
victory . Other major reasons for the Truman victory were 
the heavy support given him by labor and the farmers seeking 
to maintain their own prosperity. 
It is evident , in retrospect , that the majority of 
predictors let the public opinion polls do their thinking 
for them. The polls were wrong because they oversimplified 
the task of polling and allowed themselves to be controlled 
to a certain extent by the news media . By failing to take 
into account the undecided vote and the last minute swing to 
Truman , the polls completely misread the public mind . 
The election of 1948 was a valuable lesson for the 
pollsters and has given them the incentive to improve their 
system. The campaign was also a tribute to the fighting 
spirit of Harry S. Truman and the public that re - elected 
him President of the United States in 1948 . 
